Introduction xv
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- Cryptography Bruce Schneier Pdf
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A jeremiad suggesting our addiction to data may have made privacy obsolete. Prolific technological writer Schneier (Fellow/Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School; Carry On: Sound Advice from Schneier on Security, 2013, etc.) clearly examines how technology has transformed every interaction, noting how our intimate communications are now 'saved in ways we have no control over.' Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World by Bruce Schneier Selected quotes from Bruce Schneier. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World Copernicus Books (Springer Verlag), 2003. ISBN 0-387-02620-7 See this book at Amazon.com compiled by Tom Verhoeff in April 2004.
Buy Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C 2nd edition (094) by Bruce Schneier for up to 90% off at Textbooks.com. Written by Bruce Schneier, Ken Maxon, Audiobook narrated by Ken Maxon. Sign-in to download and listen to this audiobook today! First time visiting Audible? Get this book free when you sign up for a 30-day Trial. Download This Paper Open PDF in Browser Add Paper to My Library. Share: Permalink. Using the URL or DOI link below will ensure access to this page indefinitely. Farrell, Henry John and Schneier, Bruce, Common-Knowledge Attacks on Democracy (October 2018). Berkman Klein Center Research Publication No.
1 The Business and Economics of Security 1
Consolidation: Plague or Progress 1
Prediction: RSA Conference Will Shrink Like a Punctured Balloon 2
How to Sell Security 4
Why People Are Willing to Take Risks 4
How to Sell Security 6
Why Do We Accept Signatures by Fax? 7
The Pros and Cons of LifeLock 9
The Problem Is Information Insecurity 12
Security ROI: Fact or Fiction? 14
The Data Imperative 15
Caveat Emptor 16
Social Networking Risks 17
Do You Know Where Your Data Are? 18
Be Careful When You Come to Put Your Trust in the Clouds 21
Is Perfect Access Control Possible? 22
News Media Strategies for Survival for Journalists 24
Security and Function Creep 26
Weighing the Risk of Hiring Hackers 27
Should Enterprises Give In to IT Consumerization at the Expense of Security? 29
The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security 30
So You Want to Be a Security Expert 33
When It Comes to Security, We’re Back to Feudalism 34
I Pledge Allegiance to the United States of Convenience 35
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 36
You Have No Control Over Security on the Feudal Internet 37
2 Crime, Terrorism, Spying, and War 41
America’s Dilemma: Close Security Holes, or Exploit Them Ourselves 41
Are Photographers Really a Threat? 43
CCTV Doesn’t Keep Us Safe, Yet the Cameras Are Everywhere 45
Chinese Cyberattacks: Myth or Menace? 47
How a Classic Man-in-the-Middle Attack Saved Colombian Hostages 48
How to Create the Perfect Fake Identity 51
A Fetishistic Approach to Security Is a Perverse Way to Keep Us Safe 52
The Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists 54
Why Society Should Pay the True Costs of Security 56
Why Technology Won’t Prevent Identity Theft 58
Terrorists May Use Google Earth, but Fear Is No Reason to Ban It 60
Thwarting an Internal Hacker 62
An Enterprising Criminal Has Spotted a Gap in the Market 65
We Shouldn’t Poison Our Minds with Fear of Bioterrorism 66
Raising the Cost of Paperwork Errors Will Improve Accuracy 68
So-Called Cyberattack Was Overblown 70
Why Framing Your Enemies Is Now Virtually Child’s Play 72
Beyond Security Theater 73
Feeling and Reality 74
Refuse to Be Terrorized 76
Cold War Encryption Is Unrealistic in Today’s Trenches 77
Profiling Makes Us Less Safe 80
Fixing Intelligence Failures 81
Spy Cameras Won’t Make Us Safer 82
Scanners, Sensors Are Wrong Way to Secure the Subway 84
Preventing Terrorist Attacks in Crowded Areas 86
Where Are All the Terrorist Attacks? 87
Hard to Pull Off 88
Few Terrorists 88
Small Attacks Aren’t Enough 89
Worst-Case Thinking Makes Us Nuts, Not Safe 89
Threat of “Cyberwar” Has Been Hugely Hyped 92
Cyberwar and the Future of Cyber Conflict 94
Why Terror Alert Codes Never Made Sense 96
Debate Club: An International Cyberwar Treaty Is the Only Way to Stem the Threat 97
Overreaction and Overly Specific Reactions to Rare Risks 99
Militarizing Cyberspace Will Do More Harm Than Good 101
Rhetoric of Cyber War Breeds Fear—and More Cyber War 103
Attacks from China 103
GhostNet 104
Profitable 105
The Boston Marathon Bombing: Keep Calm and Carry On 105
Why FBI and CIA Didn’t Connect the Dots 107
The FBI’s New Wiretapping Plan Is Great News for Criminals 109
US Offensive Cyberwar Policy 112
3 Human Aspects of Security 117
Secret Questions Blow a Hole in Security 117
When You Lose a Piece of Kit, the Real Loss Is the Data It Contains 118
The Kindness of Strangers 120
Blaming the User Is Easy—But It’s Better to Bypass Them Altogether 122
The Value of Self-Enforcing Protocols 123
Reputation Is Everything in IT Security 125
When to Change Passwords 127
The Big Idea: Bruce Schneier 129
High-Tech Cheats in a World of Trust 131
Detecting Cheaters 134
Lance Armstrong and the Prisoner’s Dilemma of Doping in Professional Sports 137
The Doping Arms Race as Prisoner’s Dilemma 138
The Ever-Evolving Problem 139
Testing and Enforcing 140
Trust and Society 141
How Secure Is the Papal Election? 143
The Court of Public Opinion 147
On Security Awareness Training 150
Our New Regimes of Trust 152
4 Privacy and Surveillance 155
The Myth of the “Transparent Society” 155
Our Data, Ourselves 157
The Future of Ephemeral Conversation 158
How to Prevent Digital Snooping 160
Architecture of Privacy 162
Privacy in the Age of Persistence 164
Should We Have an Expectation of Online Privacy? 167
Offhand but On Record 168
Google’s and Facebook’s Privacy Illusion 171
The Internet: Anonymous Forever 173
A Taxonomy of Social Networking Data 175
The Difficulty of Surveillance Crowdsourcing 177
The Internet Is a Surveillance State 179
Surveillance and the Internet of Things 181
Government Secrets and the Need for Whistleblowers 184
Before Prosecuting, Investigate the Government 187
5 Psychology of Security 189
The Security Mindset 189
The Difference between Feeling and Reality in Security 191
How the Human Brain Buys Security 194
Does Risk Management Make Sense? 195
How the Great Conficker Panic Hacked into Human Credulity 197
How Science Fiction Writers Can Help, or Hurt, Homeland Security 198
Privacy Salience and Social Networking Sites 201
Security, Group Size, and the Human Brain 203
People Understand Risks—But Do Security Staff Understand People? 205
Nature’s Fears Extend to Online Behavior 206
6 Security and Technology 209
The Ethics of Vulnerability Research 209
I’ve Seen the Future, and It Has a Kill Switch 211
Software Makers Should Take Responsibility 212
Lesson from the DNS Bug: Patching Isn’t Enough 214
Why Being Open about Security Makes Us All Safer in the Long Run 216
Boston Court’s Meddling with “Full Disclosure” Is Unwelcome 218
Quantum Cryptography: As Awesome as It Is Pointless 220
Passwords Are Not Broken, but How We Choose Them Sure Is 222
America’s Next Top Hash Function Begins 223
Tigers Use Scent, Birds Use Calls—Biometrics Are Just Animal Instinct 225
The Secret Question Is: Why Do IT Systems Use Insecure Passwords? 227
The Pros and Cons of Password Masking 229
Technology Shouldn’t Give Big Brother a Head Start 231
Lockpicking and the Internet 233
The Battle Is On against Facebook and Co. to Regain Control of Our Files 235
The Difficulty of Un-Authentication 237
Is Antivirus Dead? 238
Virus and Protocol Scares Happen Every Day— but Don’t Let Them Worry You 240
The Failure of Cryptography to Secure Modern Networks 242
The Story behind the Stuxnet Virus 244
The Dangers of a Software Monoculture 247
How Changing Technology Affects Security 249
The Importance of Security Engineering 251
Technologies of Surveillance 253
When Technology Overtakes Security 255
Rethinking Security 255
7 Travel and Security 259
Crossing Borders with Laptops and PDAs 259
The TSA’s Useless Photo ID Rules 261
The Two Classes of Airport Contraband 262
Fixing Airport Security 264
Laptop Security while Crossing Borders 265
Breaching the Secure Area in Airports 268
Stop the Panic on Air Security 269
A Waste of Money and Time 271
Why the TSA Can’t Back Down 273
The Trouble with Airport Profiling 275
8 Security, Policy, Liberty, and Law 279
Memo to Next President: How to Get Cybersecurity Right 279
CRB Checking 281
State Data Breach Notification Laws: Have They Helped? 283
How to Ensure Police Database Accuracy 285
How Perverse Incentives Drive Bad Security Decisions 287
It’s Time to Drop the “Expectation of Privacy” Test 288
Who Should Be in Charge of Cybersecurity? 291
Coordinate, but Distribute Responsibility 294
“Zero Tolerance” Really Means Zero Discretion 295
US Enables Chinese Hacking of Google 297
Should the Government Stop Outsourcing Code Development? 299
Punishing Security Breaches 300
Three Reasons to Kill the Internet Kill Switch Idea 302
Internet without Borders 302
Unpredictable Side Effects 303
Security Flaws 303
Web Snooping Is a Dangerous Move 304
The Plan to Quarantine Infected Computers 307
Close the Washington Monument 310
Whitelisting and Blacklisting 312
Securing Medical Research: a Cybersecurity Point of View 313
Fear Pays the Bills, but Accounts Must Be Settled 317
Power and the Internet 319
Bruce Schneier Pdf
Danger Lurks in Growing New Internet Nationalism 321
IT for Oppression 323
The Public/Private Surveillance Partnership 325
Transparency and Accountability Don’t Hurt Security— They’re Crucial to It 327
It’s Smart Politics to Exaggerate Terrorist Threats 329
References 333
Index 347
Bruce Schneier at the Congress on Privacy & Surveillance (2013) of the École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL). | |
Born | January 15, 1963 (age 56)[1] |
---|---|
Residence | United States |
Citizenship | American |
Alma mater | |
Known for | Cryptography, security |
Scientific career | |
Fields | Computer science |
Institutions | |
Website | www.schneier.com |
Signature |
Bruce Schneier (/ˈʃnaɪ.ər/; born January 15, 1963) is an American cryptographer, computer security professional, privacy specialist and writer. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. He worked for IBM since they acquired Resilient Systems where Schneier was CTO[2][3][4] until he left at the end of June 2019.[5] He is the author of several books on general security topics, computer security and cryptography. Schneier is also a contributing writer for The Guardian news organization.[6]
- 3Viewpoints
- 3.5Homeland security
Early life[edit]
Bruce Schneier is the son of Martin Schneier, a Brooklyn Supreme Court judge. He grew up in the Flatbush neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York, attending P.S. 139 and Hunter High School.[7]
After receiving a physics bachelor's degree from the University of Rochester in 1984,[8] he went to American University in Washington, D.C. and got his master's degree in computer science in 1988.[9] He was awarded an honorary Ph.D from the University of Westminster in London, England in November 2011. The award was made by the Department of Electronics and Computer Science in recognition of Schneier's 'hard work and contribution to industry and public life'.
Schneier was a founder and chief technology officer of Counterpane Internet Security (now BT Managed Security Solutions).
Writings on computer security and general security[edit]
In 1994, Schneier published Applied Cryptography, which details the design, use, and implementation of cryptographic algorithms. In 2010 he published Cryptography Engineering, which is focused more on how to use cryptography in real systems and less on its internal design. He has also written books on security for a broader audience. In 2000, Schneier published Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World; in 2003, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World; in 2012, Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive; and in 2015, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World.[10]
Schneier writes a freely available monthly Internet newsletter on computer and other security issues, Crypto-Gram, as well as a security weblog, Schneier on Security.[11] The blog focuses on the latest threats, and his own thoughts. The weblog started out as a way to publish essays before they appeared in Crypto-Gram, making it possible for others to comment on them while the stories were still current, but over time the newsletter became a monthly email version of the blog, re-edited and re-organized.[12][citation needed] Schneier is frequently quoted in the press on computer and other security issues, pointing out flaws in security and cryptographic implementations ranging from biometrics to airline security after the September 11 attacks.
Schneier revealed on his blog that in the December 2004 issue of the SIGCSE Bulletin, three Pakistani academics, Khawaja Amer Hayat, Umar Waqar Anis, and S. Tauseef-ur-Rehman, from the International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, plagiarized an article written by Schneier and got it published.[13] The same academics subsequently plagiarized another article by Ville Hallivuori on 'Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) security' as well.[13] Schneier complained to the editors of the periodical, which generated a minor controversy.[14] The editor of the SIGCSE Bulletin removed the paper from their website and demanded official letters of admission and apology. Schneier noted on his blog that International Islamic University personnel had requested him 'to close comments in this blog entry'; Schneier refused to close comments on the blog, but he did delete posts which he deemed 'incoherent or hostile'.[13]
Viewpoints[edit]
Blockchain[edit]
Schneier warns about misplaced trust in blockchain[15] and the lack of use cases, calling Blockchain a solution in search of a problem.[16]
'What blockchain does is shift some of the trust in people and institutions to trust in technology. You need to trust the cryptography, the protocols, the software, the computers and the network. And you need to trust them absolutely, because they’re often single points of failure.'
He goes on to say that cryptocurrencies are useless and are only used by speculators looking for quick riches.
Cryptography[edit]
To Schneier, peer review and expert analysis are important for the security of cryptographic systems.[17] Mathematical cryptography is usually not the weakest link in a security chain; effective security requires that cryptography be combined with other things.[18]
The term Schneier's law was coined by Cory Doctorow in a 2004 speech.[19] The law is phrased as:
Any person can invent a security system so clever that he or she can't imagine a way of breaking it.
He attributes this to Bruce Schneier, who wrote in 1998: 'Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't break. It's not even hard. What is hard is creating an algorithm that no one else can break, even after years of analysis.'[20]
Similar sentiments had been expressed by others before. In The Codebreakers, David Kahn states: 'Few false ideas have more firmly gripped the minds of so many intelligent men than the one that, if they just tried, they could invent a cipher that no one could break', and in 'A Few Words On Secret Writing', in July 1841, Edgar Allan Poe had stated: 'Few persons can be made to believe that it is not quite an easy thing to invent a method of secret writing which shall baffle investigation. Yet it may be roundly asserted that human ingenuity cannot concoct a cipher which human ingenuity cannot resolve.'[21]
Digital rights management[edit]
Schneier is critical of digital rights management (DRM) and has said that it allows a vendor to increase lock-in.[22] Proper implementation of control-based security for the user via trusted computing is very difficult, and security is not the same thing as control.[22]
Full disclosure[edit]
Schneier is a proponent of full disclosure, i.e. making security issues public.
If researchers don't go public, things don’t get fixed. Companies don't see it as a security problem; they see it as a PR problem.[23]
Homeland security[edit]
Schneier has said that homeland security money should be spent on intelligence, investigation, and emergency response.[24] Defending against the broad threat of terrorism is generally better than focusing on specific potential terrorist plots.[24] According to Schneier, analysis of intelligence data is difficult but is one of the better ways to deal with global terrorism.[25] Human intelligence has advantages over automated and computerized analysis, and increasing the amount of intelligence data that is gathered does not help to improve the analysis process.[25] Agencies that were designed around fighting the Cold War may have a culture that inhibits the sharing of information; the practice of sharing information is more important and less of a security threat in itself when dealing with more decentralized and poorly funded adversaries such as al Qaeda.[26]
Regarding PETN—the explosive that has become terrorists' weapon of choice—Schneier has written that only swabs and dogs can detect it. He also believes that changes to airport security since 11 September 2001 have done more harm than good and he defeated Kip Hawley, former head of the Transportation Security Administration, in an Economist online debate by 87% to 13% regarding the issue.[27] He is widely credited with coining the term 'security theater' to describe some such changes.
Bruce Schneier Password Safe
As a Fellow of Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Schneier is exploring the intersection of security, technology, and people, with an emphasis on power.[28]
Movie plot threat[edit]
'Movie-plot threat' is a term Schneier coined that refers to very specific and dramatic terrorist attack scenarios, reminiscent of the behavior of terrorists in movies, rather than what terrorists actually do in the real world.[29]
Security measures created to protect against movie plot threats do not provide a higher level of real security, because such preparation only pays off if terrorists choose that one particular avenue of attack, which may not even be feasible. Real-world terrorists would also be likely to notice the highly specific security measures, and simply attack in some other way.
The specificity of movie plot threats gives them power in the public imagination, however, so even extremely unrealistic 'security theater' countermeasures may receive strong support from the public and legislators.
Among many other examples of movie plot threats, Schneier described banning baby carriers from subways, for fear that they may contain explosives.[30]
Starting in April 2006, Schneier has had an annual contest to create the most fantastic movie-plot threat.[31]
System design[edit]
Schneier has criticized security approaches that try to prevent any malicious incursion, instead arguing that designing systems to fail well is more important.[32] The designer of a system should not underestimate the capabilities of an attacker, as technology may make it possible in the future to do things that are not possible at the present.[17] Under Kerckhoffs's Principle, the need for one or more parts of a cryptographic system to remain secret increases the fragility of the system; whether details about a system should be obscured depends upon the availability of persons who can make use of the information for beneficial uses versus the potential for attackers to misuse the information.[33]
Secrecy and security aren't the same, even though it may seem that way. Only bad security relies on secrecy; good security works even if all the details of it are public.[34]
Other writing[edit]
Schneier and Karen Cooper were nominated in 2000 for the Hugo Award, in the category of Best Related Book, for their Minicon 34 Restaurant Guide, a work originally published for the Minneapolis science fiction convention Minicon which gained a readership internationally in science fiction fandom for its wit and good humor.[35]
Cryptographic algorithms[edit]
Schneier has been involved in the creation of many cryptographic algorithms.
Hash functions:Stream ciphers:
Pseudo-random number generators:
Block ciphers:
Publications[edit]
- Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 1994. ISBN0-471-59756-2
- Schneier, Bruce. Protect Your Macintosh, Peachpit Press, 1994. ISBN1-56609-101-2
- Schneier, Bruce. E-Mail Security, John Wiley & Sons, 1995. ISBN0-471-05318-X
- Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996. ISBN0-471-11709-9
- Schneier, Bruce; Kelsey, John; Whiting, Doug; Wagner, David; Hall, Chris; Ferguson, Niels. The Twofish Encryption Algorithm, John Wiley & Sons, 1996. ISBN0-471-35381-7
- Schneier, Bruce; Banisar, David. The Electronic Privacy Papers, John Wiley & Sons, 1997. ISBN0-471-12297-1
- Schneier, Bruce. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, John Wiley & Sons, 2000. ISBN0-471-25311-1
- Schneier, Bruce. Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World, Copernicus Books, 2003. ISBN0-387-02620-7
- Ferguson, Niels; Schneier, Bruce. Practical Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 2003. ISBN0-471-22357-3
- Schneier, Bruce. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, John Wiley & Sons, 2004. ISBN978-0-471-45380-2
- Schneier, Bruce. Schneier on Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2008. ISBN978-0-470-39535-6
- Ferguson, Niels; Schneier, Bruce; Kohno, Tadayoshi. Cryptography Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, 2010. ISBN978-0-470-47424-2
- Schneier, Bruce. Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that Society Needs to Thrive, John Wiley & Sons, 2012. ISBN978-1-118-14330-8
- Schneier, Bruce. Carry On: Sound Advice from Schneier on Security, John Wiley & Sons, 2013. ISBN978-1118790816
- Schneier, Bruce. Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World, W. W. Norton & Company, 2015. ISBN978-0-393-24481-6
- Schneier, Bruce. Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-connected World, W. W. Norton & Company, 2018. ISBN978-0-393-60888-5
- Cooper, Karen; Schneier, Bruce. 'Minicon 34 Restaurant Guide', Rune Press, 1999.[36]
Activism[edit]
Schneier is a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.[37]
Cryptography Bruce Schneier Pdf
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^'Bruce Schneier | Facebook'. Facebook.
- ^'Bruce Schneier, CTO of Resilient Systems, Inc'.
- ^'IBM Security Closes Acquisition of Resilient Systems' (Press release). Armonk, NY, USA: IBM Security. 2016-04-06.
- ^Schneier, Bruce (2016-02-29). 'Resilient Systems News: IBM to Buy Resilient Systems'. Schneier on Security.
- ^Schneier, Bruce (2019-06-28). 'I'm Leaving IBM'. Schneier on Security.
- ^Contributor Profile www.theguardian.com/profile/bruceschneier
- ^Samuel Newhouse (February 9, 2009). ''Schneier on Security;' A Judge's Son Builds a Reputation of Cryptic Fame'. Brooklyn Daily Eagle.
- ^Drew Amorosi (July 11, 2011). 'Interview: BT's Bruce Schneier'. InfoSecurity.
- ^Charles C. Mann Homeland Insecurity www.theatlantic.com
- ^Austin, Richard (12 March 2015). 'review of Data and Goliath: The hidden Battles to capture your data and control your world'. Cipher. www.ieee-security.org. Retrieved 18 March 2015.
- ^schneier.com
- ^Blood, Rebecca (January 2007). 'Bruce Schneier'. Bloggers on Blogging. Retrieved April 19, 2007.
- ^ abc'Schneier on Security: Plagiarism and Academia: Personal Experience'. Schneier.com. Retrieved June 9, 2009.
- ^'ONLINE – International News Network'. Onlinenews.com.pk. June 9, 2007. Archived from the original on April 7, 2010. Retrieved June 9, 2009.
- ^SCHNEIER, BRUCE (2019-02-06). 'There's No Good Reason to Trust Blockchain Technology'. Wired. ISSN1059-1028. Retrieved 2019-02-06.
- ^'Was Bruce Schneier von Blockchain, IoT und Quantencomputern hält'. www.netzwoche.ch (in German). Retrieved 2019-02-06.
- ^ abSchneier, Bruce (1997). 'Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks'. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^Ferguson, Niels; Schneier, Bruce. 'Practical Cryptography: Preface'. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^Cory Doctorow (2004-06-17). 'Microsoft Research DRM talk'. Archived from the original on 2006-12-02. Retrieved 2006-12-31.
- ^'Memo to the Amateur Cipher Designer', October 15, 1998, Crypto-Gram
- ^'Schneier's law'
- ^ abSchneier, Bruce (2008-02-07). 'With iPhone, 'Security' Is Code for 'Control''. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^'Charlie Miller's Punishment By Apple Tests A Complex Relationship' Huffington Post, 2011.
- ^ abSchneier, Bruce (2005-09-08). 'Terrorists Don't Do Movie Plots'. Wired News.
- ^ abSchneier, Bruce (2004-01-09). 'Homeland Insecurity'. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^Schneier, Bruce (2010-01-15). 'Fixing intelligence failures – SFGate'. SFGate. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^'International terrorism: AQAP tries again: Good intelligence work still leaves questions over airport security', The Economist, dated 12 May 2012.
- ^'Berkman Center Announces 2013–2014 Community'. Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. July 8, 2013. Retrieved 8 July 2013.
- ^Ben Makuch (8 October 2014). '2014 Will Not Be the Year of the First 'Online Murder''. Motherboard Vice.com. Retrieved 18 June 2015.
- ^Schneier, Bruce. 'Schneier on Security: Exploding Baby Carriages in Subways'.
And if we ban baby carriages from the subways, and the terrorists put their bombs in duffel bags instead, have we really won anything?
- ^Schneier, Bruce. 'Schneier on Security: Announcing: Movie-Plot Threat Contest'.
- ^Homeland Insecurity, Atlantic Monthly, September 2002
- ^Schneier, Bruce (2002-05-15). 'Crypto-Gram: May 15, 2002'. Retrieved 2011-04-08.
- ^Doctorow, Cory. Little Brother. New York: Tor Teen, 2008, page 129.
- ^'Hugo Awards Nominations'. Locus Magazine. April 21, 2000.
- ^'Minicon 34 Restaurant Guide'(PDF). Minnesota Science Fiction Society.
- ^Jeschke, Rebecca (2013-06-27). 'Renowned Security Expert Bruce Schneier Joins EFF Board of Directors'. Retrieved 2013-07-06.
External links[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Bruce Schneier. |
Bruce Schneier Applied Cryptography Pdf
Wikiquote has quotations related to: Bruce Schneier |
- Profile of Bruce Schneier in Politico Magazine 'Glenn Greenwald's Encryption Guru,' by Alex Carp, March 16, 2014
- Schneier at the 2009 RSA conference, video with Schneier participating on the Cryptographer's Panel, April 21, 2009, Moscone Center, San Francisco
- Bruce Schneier on Real Law Radio, Bruce talks with Bob DiCello on the legal news talk radio program, Real Law Radio, about the case involving a Philadelphia school that allegedly spied on its students via the webcam on their computers (Podcasts/Saturday February 27, 2010).
- Roberts, Russ (June 10, 2013). 'Schneier on Power, the Internet, and Security'. EconTalk. Library of Economics and Liberty.
- Bruce Schneier at Google, 19 June 2013. Schneier discusses various aspects of Internet computing and global geo-politics including trust, power relations, control, cooperative systems, ethics, laws, and security technologies. (55 minutes)
- Bruce Schneier interviewed on The WELL by Jon Lebkowsky, August 2012
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